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The Naturalness of Dualism
U W E  M E IX N E R
In his famous biography of Samuel Johnson, James Boswell recounts 
the following anecdote (see, for example, Boswell 1986: 122):
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time to­
gether of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non­
existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely 
ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not 
true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity 
with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force 
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus'
This anecdote can serve as a catalyst for various insights. In particu­
lar, it enables one to see the doctrine of psychophysical dualism in a 
new light. I hope that this will become apparent in this essay as it 
progresses.
1. T HE NATURE OF P HILOSOPHICAL O PINION
Boswell’s text takes us back to a time (precisely speaking, it is the 
year 1763) when ontological idealism seemed irrefutable— though it
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was perceived to be false— and even first-rate intellectuals did not 
manage to argue against it without helping themselves to wordless 
means of argument, exhibiting in doing so a certain amount of exas­
peration. Johnson’s eighteenth-century kick argument (it can be 
strengthened by any amount of knock, push, and pull arguments) 
against ontological idealism (and for the existence of an external and 
material world) is strikingly similar to G. E. Moore’s twentieth­
century “proof” for the existence of an external and material world 
(and against ontological idealism): Moore’s holding up his two hands 
and concluding that there are at least two external (and material) ob­
jects in the world.' Both Moore’s argument and Johnson’s argument 
are of the same type: they both enact—by bodily activity—a common- 
sensical objection against ontological idealism. Both Moore’s argu­
ment and Johnson’s are, however, not entirely successful—for Bishop 
Berkeley (or any other reasonable ontological idealist, for that mat­
ter) was of course far from denying that there are hands in the world 
(which one can lift) or large stones (against which one can strike 
one’s foot). Berkeley merely denied that there are such things as 
mind-independent (or external) material objects; according to Berke­
ley, hands and stones, properly conceived, exist all right, but are not 
mind-independent material objects.2 Much later in the history of 
ideas, Edmund Husserl—perhaps the most sophisticated ontological 
idealist of all time—held that hands, stones, and other cases of mate­
rial objects are according to their essence the (intentional) correlates of 
(intentional) conscious states, that (therefore) the idea of these things 
existing independently of (or: external to) conscious states cannot be 
rationally defended and is indeed substantially (“sachlich”) absurd.3
Ontological idealism is still very much worthy of philosophical 
attention, though most philosophers nowadays are satisfied merely 
to consider some popular caricature of it. Deplorably, they take the 
caricature to be properly representative of the doctrine. The carica­
ture indeed—not the doctrine—can be easily dismissed, whether it 
be by lifting hands or by striking stones, or by emphasizing (usually 
somewhat indignantly) that we cannot normally make the world be 
so-and-so simply by thinking it to be so-and-so.
But the pervasive substituting of popular caricature for the real 
thing is symptomatic of the fact that the time of a philosophical doc-
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trine is over. The time of (the widespread belief of the philosophers 
in) ontological idealism is over (which does not mean that ontologi­
cal idealism might not have a comeback someday). By and large, the 
doctrine is no longer taken seriously. Today, quite a different philo­
sophical opinion rules among the philosophers: materialism, the very 
opposite of ontological idealism. It is illuminating to consider the 
similarities and dissimilarities between the hegemony of ontological 
idealism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the hege­
mony of materialism in the latter part of the twentieth and at the be­
ginning of the twenty-first century.
Two Hegemonies
Ontological idealism once was felt to be a tyrant who usurped the 
throne of truth. But it was also felt that this tyrant doctrine was 
quite unassailable in its act of usurpation, because of its philosophical 
reasonableness, the quality of philosophical argument in favor of it. 
See the above quotation from Johnson’s biography, where Boswell 
observes that “though we are satisfied Tthis]  doctrine is not true, it is 
impossible to refute it.” I take it that many knowledgeable people of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would have made a similar 
comment, if given the opportunity.
Materialism, in contrast, is not felt these days to be a tyrant who 
usurps the throne of truth; at least, most of today’s (Western) phi­
losophers do not consider it in that light. The simple reason for this 
is that most of today’s philosophers are firmly convinced of the truth 
of materialism.
As a consequence of the firmness of their commitment to ma­
terialism, the doctrine turns out to be irrefutable for extrinsic rea­
sons. Every attempt to refute materialism must—qua attempted 
refutation—address those who believe in materialism and must con­
sist in an argument; but every argument has premises; no argu­
ment can succeed in the eyes of those it addresses if they believe 
in the negation of its conclusion invariably—one is tempted to say: 
automatically—more firmly than in the conjunction of the argu­
ment’s premises. This is the present situation. Unsurprisingly, it
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creates in the adherents of materialism the idea that the doctrine is 
irrefutable for intrinsic reasons, that is, because of its philosophical 
reason ableness.
But one wonders what could have lodged the doctrine of materi­
alism so firmly with so many reasonable people in the first place. In 
this regard, a comparison with that other at-one-time-hegemonic 
monistic doctrine-—ontological idealism—does afford interesting 
perspectives. Ontological idealism grew out of a philosophical atmo­
sphere which was, in the main, created by Descartes. Descartes dis­
covered that his realm of consciousness could be regarded as a closed 
world all by itself—a world, he perceived, which in principle might 
also exist all by itself. It was not some dogmatic belief—above all, no 
religious interests of any kind—that led him to this view, which he 
put forward in his immensely influential Meditations* The driving 
force behind Descartes’s discovery was radical skepticism, a skepti­
cism which, as far as Descartes was concerned, is indeed in (optimis­
tic) search of absolute certainty, but which is radical nonetheless. 
Note that radical skepticism is an attitude that is at home solely 
among the philosophers— and therefore, a philosophical doctrine 
that grows out of radical skepticism has perhaps more right to be 
called philosophical than a doctrine whose inspiration is common 
sense, science, religion, or some combination of these three non- 
philosophical sources of ideas.
To Descartes’s discovery Berkeley added—and I present what 
seems to me the best way to reconstruct the essence of his thought— 
that because one cannot help being located in one’s closed, perspec­
tiva! realm of consciousness and cannot ever leave it,5 one has no 
reason whatsoever to suppose that there exists anything that could 
exist even if no realm of consciousness existed, in other words, that 
there exists anything which is mind-independent. Considerations of 
parsimony and non-arbitrariness, therefore, dictate that there does 
not exist anything mind-independent.
It should be noted that the above Berkeleyan argumentation for 
ontological idealism (which thesis is, in fact, not identical to but en­
tailed by the thesis that there does not exist anything mind­
independent; see below) is strictly philosophical—just as is Des­
cartes s argumentation for the in-principle possibility that his realm
The Naturalness of Dualism 29
of consciousness is all there is. It is true that Berkeley had ulterior 
motives—religious motives—for his position. But this does nothing 
to alter the essential fact: Berkeley—whether in ideal reconstruction 
(as above) or without such treatment, in his raw arguments—was ar­
guing for ontological idealism exclusively on philosophical grounds.
How strikingly different is the picture if we now turn to the mo­
nism that is diametrically opposite to ontological idealism: to the 
currently hegemonic monism, materialism! If a proponent of materi­
alism is asked on what grounds he accepts this doctrine, the very 
likely first answer is this: it is the only global metaphysical doctrine 
that is compatible with science. If this were true, then materialism 
would have to be a consequence of science: if materialism is the only 
global metaphysical doctrine that is compatible with science, then 
the negation of materialism—which is also a global metaphysical 
doctrine—is not compatible with science, and therefore materialism 
is a consequence of science; that is, it is either a logical consequence 
of science alone or at least a logical consequence of science plus some 
uncontroversial philosophical principles of reason (methodological 
or otherwise) that “go without saying." But materialism does not 
seem to be a consequence of science—neither a straight consequence 
of it (following logically from science alone) nor a philosophically un- 
controversially supported consequence of it (following logically from 
science plus some uncontroversial philosophical principles of reason).
It does not seem to be a consequence of science that every con­
crete (i.e., nonabstract) entity is physical (which is the thesis of mate­
rialism, or physicalism),'1 though perhaps at some time* in the future it 
will be a consequence of science that every concrete entity is one-to- 
one correlated with a physical entity. But there do not seem to be un­
controversial philosophical principles of reason that would allow one 
to conclude from this that every concrete entity is identical with a 
physical one. Therefore, that some concrete entity is nonphysical 
(the negation of the thesis of materialism) does not seem to be incom­
patible with science, and therefore materialism dot's not seem to be 
the only global metaphysical doctrine that is compatible with science.
However, the position of the proponents of materialism does not 
appear as untenable as it would have to appear if they had to rely 
solely on the incompatibility of every other global metaphysical
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doctrine with science. For materialism, there is a “hidden” source of 
philosophical strength. W hat is that hidden source of strength?
The Strength of Materialism
That source provides strength to materialism ex negativo, for it simply 
consists in the difficulties (the wounds, so to speak) of dualism— 
dualism being the global metaphysical doctrine that some concrete 
entities are physical, and some nonphysical. Dualism, materialists 
say (when they become philosophically thoughtful and stop harping 
on an alleged preference of science for materialism), is untenable be­
cause of certain difficulties connected with it. There are indeed such 
difficulties; they have to do with two salient relations between physi­
cal concrete entities and nonphysical ones. These two relations be­
tween what is physical and what is nonphysical but concrete do pose 
difficulties—which, indeed, are frequently believed to be insurmount­
able. As a matter of fact, the discussion has focused on only one of the 
two relations: the causal relation. But we shall see in the next section 
that the intentional relation poses a difficulty for dualism that is even 
greater than the difficulty posed by the causal one.
Dualism has its difficulties—it is quite another question whether 
they make dualism untenable. But suppose, for the sake of the argu­
ment, that those difficulties are indeed insurmountable, and that 
dualism is, therefore, untenable. Does it follow that materialism is 
correct, or at least that materialism is the position which one ought 
to believe in? It does not follow. The following disjunction is logi­
cally true, and its degree of rational credence is 1:
All concrete entities7 are physical8 (materialism), or 
some concrete entities are physical, and some nonphysical 
(dualism), or
all concrete entities are nonphysical (ontological idealism).
Therefore, in terms of truth, if dualism is not true, then it follows 
that the disjunction of materialism and ontological idealism is true; it 
does not follow that materialism is true. And in terms of rational cre­
dence, if the degree of rational credence for dualism becomes 0, then
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it follows that the degree of rational credence for the disjunction of 
materialism and ontological idealism is 1; it does not follow that the 
degree of rational credence for materialism is 1.
The difficulties of dualism are not insurmountable—and indeed 
the situation is such that if they were insurmountable, then this 
would be far from pointing us towards materialism more strongly 
than towards ontological idealism. (For the justification of this asser­
tion, which goes beyond what was established in the previous para­
graph, see the next section.) What does this suggest about the nature 
of belief in materialism—given that materialism is, as we have seen, 
not the only global metaphysical doctrine that is compatible with sci­
ence? That belief in materialism is not as well-founded—scientifically 
or philosophically—as materialist believers usually think it is. In fact, 
it is less well-founded than, say, Husserl’s belief in ontological ideal­
ism. Nevertheless, the hegemony of ontological idealism, which once 
seemed unshakable (see Boswell’s anecdote), is over. The current he­
gemony of materialism, which seems just as unshakable, will be over, 
too. It is to be hoped that the passing of the hegemony of materialism 
will not happen for reasons that are foreign to reason.
2 . T H E  D IF F IC U L T IE S  OF D UALISM
Johnson and Boswell were dualists. This tickles the imagination. 
How would Johnson have refuted materialism if materialism had been 
the ruling global metaphysical doctrine of his days—that is, how 
would he have refuted materialism in a way that is o f one kind with his 
“refutation” of ontological idealism? Consider the following variant 
of Boswell’s anecdote:
After we came from the beach, we stood talking for some time to­
gether of Daniel Dennett’s—the famous atheist’s—ingenious soph­
istry to prove the non-existence of consciousness,9 and that every 
thing in the universe is merely material. I observed, that though we 
are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I 
shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, strik­
ing his naked foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he re­
bounded from it, ‘I refute it thus!
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Imagine Johnson’s pain! Surely Johnson has demonstrated (in this 
counterfactual situation) that there is pain in the world (just as in the 
historical situation that Boswell recounts Johnson has certainly dem­
onstrated that there is at least one large stone in the world). But does 
this refute materialism? Has he shown that at least one concrete en­
tity is nonphysical, that is, not mind-independently physical* (for 
elucidation, see the—admittedly rather important—note 8)?
In Boswell’s anecdote, Johnson does not succeed in demonstrating 
that there is at least one concrete mind-independently physical*, that is, 
physical, entity (cf. note 8), namely, the large stone against which he 
strikes his foot. Though it is obvious that that stone is an entity that 
is concrete mA physical* (yn a neutral root-sense; see note 8), Johnson 
has not shown that it is also a mind-independent entity (which short­
coming, one may be sure, Berkeley would have pointed out against 
Johnson).10 In the (obviously fictitious) variant of Boswell’s anecdote, 
however, it does indeed seem that Johnson has succeeded in demon­
strating that there is at least one concrete not mind-independently 
physical*, that is, nonphysical, entity, namely, the pain he feels in his 
naked foot when he strikes this foot against the large stone. This pain 
is certainly a concrete entity. Now suppose—for reductio—that it is 
also a physical entity. Hence it is a mind-independently physical* en­
tity, and therefore a mind-independent entity. Hence that pain could 
exist even if no realm of consciousness existed— which, however, is 
plainly absurd.
The merits of this argument seem considerable to me. It hinges 
on two things: (1) on the conception of physicalness employed, 
namely, mind-independent physicalness*, and (2) on the conception 
of mind-independence employed, namely, being able to exist even if 
no realm of consciousness existed. However, the use of both con­
ceptions seems entirely appropriate in formulating the thesis of 
materialism/physicalism. If materialists speak of physical entities, 
they mean mind-independently physical* entities,11 and by this, in 
turn, they mean entities that are physical* and could exist even if no 
realm of consciousness existed.12
Thus, materialism stands refuted. And it has become clear why I 
remarked in the previous section that the situation regarding the dif­
ficulties of dualism is such that if those difficulties were insurmount-
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able (disqualifying dualism), then this would be far from pointing us 
towards materialism more strongly than towards ontological ideal­
ism: this is trivially so, because, as we have just seen, ontological 
idealism is the only viable alternative to dualism (since materialism 
stands refuted).
But it is time to look at the difficulties of dualism. They are the 
following two, of which the first one gets practically all of the at­
tention:
(1) Dualism assumes that some concrete entities are physical, and some 
nonphysical. This means that according to dualism some concrete 
entities are mind-independently physical*, and some are not. But 
if this is true, how can any of the concrete entities that are not mind- 
independently physical*—for example, certain mental events— 
causally interact with any of the entities that are mind-independently 
physical*—for example, certain brain states? This is a problem, for 
it seems that we cannot do without such causal interactions.
(2) According to dualism some concrete entities are mind-independently 
physical* and some are not. But if this is true, how can any of the 
concrete objects that are mind-independently physical*—for ex­
ample, stones and trees—be the intentional objects of experiences— 
for example, of the visual experiences of Samuel Johnson, which, qua 
(dualistically conceived) experiences, are not mind-independently 
physical* objects? This is a problem, for it seems that we cannot do 
without physical (i.e., mind-independently physical*) objects being 
the intentional objects of experiences.
If one considers the kind of opposition to dualism that these two dif­
ficulties, each in its turn, appear to favor, then one finds that the first 
difficulty primarily suggests materialism (as the way to escape from 
it), whereas the second difficulty primarily suggests ontological ide­
alism. Since ontological idealism is not much en vogue these days, the 
second difficulty, as far as I know, lies idle and makes no converts 
from dualism to ontological idealism (but I am not sure of this and 
cannot be); I submit, however, that the second difficulty played a con­
siderable role in making Husserl an ontological idealist. The first 
difficulty, in contrast, is cited these days ad nauseam as the main
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motivation for (accepting) materialism—in spite of the fact that if a 
monistic position were indeed the key to healthy causal relationships 
between the mental and the physical*, then ontological idealism 
would seem to fit this role just as well as materialism.
Both difficulties have solutions that leave dualism intact. But the 
second difficulty—despite its current state of neglect— is consider­
ably more difficult than the first one.
3. T HE D IFFIC U L T IE S  OF D UALISM O VERCOM E
The solution to difficulty 1 consists in conceiving of causation in such 
a manner that entities which are mind-independently physical*— 
that is, which are physical* and could exist even if no realm of con­
sciousness existed—can still causally interact with entities that are 
not mind-independently physical*, for example, with pain experi­
ences. Such a conception of causation is possible, and an adequate 
theory of causation had better not rule it out. From the fact that A  
could exist without C existing (i.e., from the fact that A  is in a certain 
manner ontologically independent of C),13 whereas B  could not exist 
without C existing, it simply does not in general follow that B  cannot 
be a cause of A.™ From the fact that moonshine could exist without 
the sun existing, whereas sunshine could not exist without the sun 
existing, it simply does not follow that sunshine cannot be a cause 
of moonshine (on the contrary: sunshine is a cause of moonshine). 
There is nothing to be balked at in the preceding statement. And 
there is as little to be balked at in the following statement: from the 
fact that a certain avoidance action of an animal could exist without 
(any realm of) consciousness existing, whereas the attendant pain 
experience of the animal could not exist without consciousness ex­
isting, it simply does not follow that the animal’s pain experience is 
not a cause of the animal’s avoidance action (especially if that action 
is prolonged).
The existence of nonphysical causation of physical events—that 
is, that there are mind-independently physical* events which are 
caused by entities that are not mind-independently physical*—is 
often denied on the basis of some principle or other of the causal clo-
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sure of the physical world. There would be reason to  be impressed 
by closure principles if they were consequences of science (in the 
sense explained in the section “Two Hegemonies” above). But they 
are not consequences of science; they are just plain metaphysical pos­
tulates, which are motivated to a large part by— materialism. This 
bias in favor of materialism disqualifies them from being legitimately 
made use of in arguing against nonphysical causation of physical 
events if the ultimate purpose in doing so is to attack dualism. And 
attacking dualism usually is the ultimate purpose of using closure 
principles against the nonphysical causation of physical events, in 
view of the fact that the nonphysical causation of physical events is 
indeed something that dualism can hardly do without: the general 
causal impotence of the nonphysical (even of the nonphysical and 
concrete) with regard to physical events is not really an attractive 
option for dualists.15
A solution to difficulty 2 is much harder to find (and, in fact, I am 
not at all sure that I have found one). The point of the difficulty has 
been very well expressed by Kant in his Prolegomena, §9:
For what is contained in the object QGegenstand; Kant is speaking 
about nonabstract objects] as it is in itself, I can know only if the 
object is present to me and given to me. But even then it is incom­
prehensible how the intuiting Tdie Anschauung] of a present thing 
should make it known to me as it is in itself, since its properties can­
not transmigrate into my power of presentation Tmeine Vorstel- 
lungskraftj. (Kant 1968: 144; my translation)
Kant’s proposed solution to the difficulty is to dissolve it by main­
taining that, contrary to the assumption that gives rise to the diffi­
culty, mind-independent concrete objects (Dinge an sich) cannot, in 
fact, ever be present and given (as intentional objects) to anyone, and 
that therefore what is contained in a concrete object as it is in itself— 
what properties it has in itself, that is, as a mind-independent object— 
cannot ever be known. In particular, mind-independent physical* 
objects are not (intentional) objects of experience; all we ever deal 
with in experience are representations (Erscheinungen) o f  mind­
independent concrete objects (in the existence of which Kant,
36 Uwe Meixner
however, continued to believe)—representations that invariably are 
not mind-independently physical* objects.
Kant was a representationalist. But in contrast to so many others 
who think that all that we ever deal with are representations and not 
the represented objects themselves, Kant was not epistemologically 
naive: if representations are all that we ever deal with, then, indeed, 
the reality which they represent must remain unknown to us; after 
all, we cannot then take a look at what is behind the scenes and make 
comparisons between the representations on the one hand and what 
they represent on the other (since, according to supposition, repre­
sentations are all that we ever deal with). Kant resolutely bit this bul­
let. Other philosophers, however, found the skeptical consequences of 
Kantianism regarding our knowledge of reality in itself unpalatable.
Our epistemic grip on reality in itself can, however, be vindicated 
in a surprising way if one adopts ontological idealism—and, of 
course, is correct in doing so. Then there is nothing behind Kant’s 
“Erscheinungen”; then they—the appearances (that is, appearances 
qua objects of appearance, not appearances qua vehicles of appear­
ance)—do not represent anything; rather, they themselves are the re­
ality in itself, and that reality is given, present to us, and therefore 
can be known by us. The price for this is that there are no physical 
objects:
Suppose there were some physical object. Hence some concrete 
object would be physical—this follows because ‘physical’ entails ‘con­
crete’ (since ‘physical*’ entails ‘concrete’). But that some concrete ob­
ject is physical contradicts the thesis of ontological idealism (see the 
section “The Strength of Materialism” above), according to which 
every concrete entity—hence also every concrete object16—is non­
physical.
The consequence that there are no physical objects is not as bad 
as it sounds. It is not as bad as it sounds because ontological idealists 
can combine their denial of physical objects—that is, their denial of 
mind-independently physical* objects— with accepting as many 
vamA-dependently physical* objects as are needed as intentional ob­
jects of our experiences and thoughts of the physical*. Berkeley left 
the mind-dependence of mind-dependently physical* objects unana­
lyzed (and, notoriously, he often confused appearances qua objects of
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appearance with appearances qua vehicles of appearance),17 whereas 
Husserl set himself the tremendous task of exploring and exhibiting 
the essential structure of their constitution—of the constitution of 
their reality and of their so-being, including their peculiar “mind­
transcendence"— as an achievement in consciousness.1S
But the advantages of ontological idealism are not for dualists, 
who, after all, normally find the thesis that there are no physical ob­
jects simply preposterous (just as materialists find that thesis prepos­
terous; note that the thesis is incompatible not only with normal 
dualism, but also with materialism, since there certainly are some 
concrete objects). But how can dualists, in struggling with difficulty 
2, sail through between the Scylla of representationalism and the 
Charybdis of ontological idealism?
Consider, for further clarification, a difficulty which is similar to 
difficulty 2: consider the proposition that the moon orbits around the 
earth (wot the statement “The moon orbits around the earth”). Some­
how this proposition—which is not a physical* entity, not even a 
concrete entity—manages to be about the moon, which is a paradig­
matic mind-independently physical* object. But how can this be? 
Neither can the moon be plausibly considered an abstract entity (if 
this could be done, it would put the moon into the proposition— and, 
indeed, solve the problem), nor can it be plausibly maintained that 
the proposition is not directly about the moon: that it is about the 
moon only via some abstract representation of it, the moon-in-the- 
proposition, so to speak. I will not try so solve this conundrum.
Consider instead your experience of seeing the moon. Somehow 
also this experience—which, again, is not a physical* entity, although 
this time it is a concrete entity—manages to be about the moon. How 
can this be—without the moon being taken, so to speak, into the ex­
perience and losing its mind-independence, and without the experi­
ence being not really (i.e., not immediately) about the moon, but 
about a mind-dependent representation of it? This is the problem.
Its solution (or rather: the direction for its solution) is this: there’s 
one concrete and homogeneous reality, which is nevertheless divided 
into (A) the mind-independently physical* (= the physical) and (B) 
the concrete but not mind-independently physical* (= the concrete 
and nonphysical, in other w-ords: the mental broadly conceived), part
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(B) being divided in its turn into (Bl) the concrete but nonphysi­
cal* (= the mental narrowly conceived) and (B2) the mind-dependently 
physical*. Thus, the one concrete and homogeneous reality is di­
vided, and the means of dividing it is negation. But this in no way 
compromises the essential oneness and homogeneity of the one con­
crete and homogeneous reality—no more so than the essential one­
ness and homogeneity of the realm of natural numbers is in any way 
compromised by dividing that realm into various disjunctive classes 
of numbers (say, £B2j uneven primes, [B l^ uneven nonprimes, and 
QA] even numbers). The difficulty in envisaging mind-independently 
physical* objects as intentional objects of experiences (experiences 
being—for dualists—concrete, nonphysical*, and trivially mind­
dependent events) is, therefore, largely illusory. It is a product of fal­
laciously interpreting division and exclusion as unrelatedness or even as 
repugnance. Though a mind-independently physical* object can exist 
without any realm of consciousness existing, it can nevertheless fit 
into a mind-dependently nonphysical* experience— not, of course, as 
a part of it, but as that which the experience grasps. The oneness and 
homogeneity of the one concrete reality enables this sui generis re­
lation, just as it enables causal interaction between experiences and 
mind-independently physical* objects.
4 . T HE T H REEFO LD  N ATURALNESS OF D UALISM
Dualism is natural in a threefold manner. For one thing, dualism is 
philosophically natural—in striking contrast to the two monistic posi­
tions of materialism and ontological idealism.19 A position is philo­
sophically natural if, and only if, that position seems correct to most 
people who have not steeped themselves in philosophical reflection, 
in short, to most of the philosophically innocent. It does seem correct 
to most of the philosophically innocent— to common sense, in other 
words— that there is a mind-independently physical* (therefore—  
ipso facto—concrete) world; this disqualifies ontological idealism 
from being philosophically natural. And it does seem correct to  most 
of the philosophically innocent—to common sense— that there is a 
concrete world which is not mind-independently physical*, but, in 
part, even mind-dependently nonphysical* (i.e., the realm of con-
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sciousness); this disqualifies materialism from being philosophically 
natural. Dualism is the remaining, philosophically natural, position.
Philosophical innocence is not cultural innocence. In fact, for us 
human beings, there is no such thing as cultural innocence. Cultural 
naturalness, therefore, has nothing to do with cultural innocence. 
Nevertheless, dualism is also culturally natural—in the sense that the 
overwhelming number of cultures in the course of human history 
was, by and large, based on dualism, with materialism and ontologi­
cal idealism occurring in some of the most highly developed cultures 
as elitist positions, parasitic on dualism (i.e., living mainly by opposi­
tion to dualism).
What is philosophically or culturally natural need not be true. 
But neither need it be false. We have seen that dualism does not fare 
badly on philosophical reflection, either. Dualism’s philosophically 
reflected standing is certainly not as bad as it is proclaimed to be 
by dualism’s many enemies in the Western world. Indeed, much of 
the criticism that is leveled against dualism is neither fair nor free 
of a peculiar bigotry. (For a spirited response to such criticism, see 
Meixner 2004.) Dualism can hold its own against materialism, and it 
can also hold its own against ontological idealism (though it will not 
have escaped notice that the position of dualism is much harder to 
maintain against ontological idealism than against materialism). This 
gives the philosophical and cultural naturalness of dualism a rational 
sanction. It also should be noted that already the philosophical natu­
ralness of dualism—and the cultural naturalness of dualism—pro­
vide, in themselves, some rational support to dualism (I am not, of 
course, saying that this support is rationally decisive).
Finally, but most importantly, dualism is also biologically natural. 
The fact of dualism is an outcome of biological evolution. I have de­
fended this position at length in several of my publications.-0 Here I 
will be content to point out the central ideas. Much of an animal’s life 
can be taken care of by a deterministic automaton-—and this is what 
animals (including human beings) to a large part are: deterministic 
automata. But, as a matter of fact, the world is also in such a w ay that 
the property of being provided with a causally powerful (hence non- 
epiphenomenal), nonpredetermined subject of experience—in other 
words, with a free consciousness-guided decision maker'1— is an evo­
lutionary asset for an animal (in the familiar sense: having such a
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subject of experience is advantageous to the animal’s survival and 
well-being). Therefore, the continual emergence and sophistication 
of the mind property (i.e., the property of having an active and free 
subject of experience)—the existence of which is a natural possibility 
(that is, is allowed by the laws of nature)— was favored by evolution, 
once that property had made its appearance on the stage of the world. 
Its appearance was brought about by the confluence of the right 
causes, under the right circumstances (whether that confluence was 
entirely fortuitous or at least in part the effect of design—it does not 
here matter),22 and by variation and selection the mind property has 
finally developed to its present (known) height in human beings. But 
subjects of experience, and experiences themselves, are nonphysical* 
and (trivially) mind-dependent entities, not only in human beings but 
in all conscious animals. Hence dualism is a product of natural evolu­
tion, and therefore dualism is not only philosophically and culturally 
natural; it is biologically natural as well. The former two kinds of du­
alism’s naturalness can in fact be said to find their natural explana­
tion in this latter naturalness of dualism.
A PPEN D IX : M OORE’S P ROOF OF AN E XTERNAL W ORLD
Moore argues as follows:
Obviously, then, there are thousands of different things such that, if, 
at any time, I can prove any one of them, I shall have proved the ex­
istence of things outside of us.. . .  I can prove now, for instance, that 
two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and 
saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one 
hand,’ and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and 
here is another.’ (Moore 1959: 145-46)
This argument was first presented to the public in 1939. But already 
in a lecture of 1928/1929 Moore had spelled out a main reason for 
being dissatisfied with his argument— if intended as a refutation of 
ontological idealism (but only with this intention can his argument 
be considered interesting):
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B. [(Berkeley] is commonly held to have denied the reality of matter; 
and so, in a sense, he does. But if you read him carefully you will find 
he does not deny the reality of human bodies, & clouds, & mountains 
& loaves of bread. On the contrary he insists he holds such things 
are real. He is careful to say that what he denies is only matter in the 
philosophical sense. . . . And in trying to define what the sense [the 
philosophical sense] is, he mentions one characteristic which is, I 
think, often included—that of being independent of perception. . . . 
It may possibly be true, as B. would have said, that this desk is not in­
dependent of perception. (Moore 1966: 15-16; emphasis original)
Thus, Berkeley would surely have pointed out against Moore’s argu­
ment for the existence of an external world that Moore has failed to 
show that the hands he holds up are independent of perception, in­
deed, that he has failed to show that they are mind-independent, and 
that, therefore, Moore has failed to present us (and himself) with 
things that are outside of us (and himself)— in the sense of ‘outside 
of’ (or ‘external to’) that is relevant for refuting ontological idealism. 
And it seems indeed that by making this objection, Berkeley would 
have rendered Moore’s argument ineffectual against ontological ide­
alism. (Moore does have a response to the Berkeleyan objection. But 
although Moore is entirely within his rights to give that response, 
against the ontological idealists it simply amounts to a begging of 
the question. The nature of the response will become apparent at the 
end of this appendix.)
Curiously, Moore does not seem to remember in 1939 what once 
was already clear enough to him, when he lectured on the question 
whether material things are real back in the twenties of the twentieth 
century. Compare the last quotation from Moore with the following:
There is, therefore, according to him PKant], a sense of ‘external,’ a 
sense in w hich the w-ord has been commonly used by philosophers— 
such that, if ‘external’ be used in that sense, then from the proposi­
tion ‘Two dogs exist’ it will not follow that there are some external 
things. W hat this supposed sense is I do not think that Kant himself 
ever succeeded in explaining clearly; nor do I know of any reason 
for supposing that philosophers ever have used ‘external’ in a sense,
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such that in that sense things that are met with in space are not 
external. (Moore 1959: 139; emphasis original)
Apparently it has escaped Moore’s attention that in the sense of ex­
ternal’ that Kant has in mind the word designates the very character­
istic which turns ‘matter’ into Berkeley’s “matter in the philosophical 
sense,” namely, the characteristic of being mind-independent (or in­
dependent of perception). And, contrary to what Moore thinks to be 
the case, there is good reason for supposing that Kant is right in 
believing that the word ‘external’ in this sense— namely, the sense 
of ‘mind-independent’—has been commonly used by philosophers. 
Moreover, Kant is surely right in supposing that, if ‘external’ be used 
in that sense, then from the proposition ‘Two dogs exist’ it will not 
follow that there are some external things; nor will this follow from 
the proposition ‘Two hands exist’—because neither two existing 
dogs nor two existing hands are ipso facto mind-independent things, 
as Berkeley and Kant would have objected against Moore’s “proof of 
an external world” if it had come to their attention. Finally, not a few 
philosophers have used ‘external’ in a sense—namely, in the sense of 
‘mind-independent’—such that, according to them, things that are 
met with in space are «of external. Indeed, neither Kant nor Berkeley 
would have been averse to seeing his own view expressed in that way, 
provided it was clear that the word ‘external’ was, in the relevant con­
text, just a synonym for ‘mind-independent.’
It should not go without mention that Moore does, after all, hit 
on this philosophical sense of the word ‘external,’ the sense in which 
it means as much as ‘mind-independent’: “To say of anything that it 
is external to our minds . .  . [(means] . . . that from a proposition to 
the effect that it existed at a specified time, it in no case follows that 
any of us were having experiences at the time in question” (Moore 
1959: 143; emphasis original). This is near enough to “it could exist 
without any realm of consciousness existing” and can, in fact, be 
made equivalent to it (for this, one just needs to give the “us” the 
greatest possible extension and replace the “at the time in question” 
by “at any time”— modifications, I believe, Moore could not have had 
any reason to be averse to if they had been proposed to him). Moore 
does decide to use the word ‘external’ in the sense of ‘mind-
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independent,’ and he therefore does intend his “proof of an external 
world” as a proof of a mind-independent world. With his hand ac­
tion, Moore is indeed attacking ontological idealism, just like Dr. 
Johnson— 176 years earlier—was attacking ontological idealism 
with his foot action.
How, exactly, does he do so? Moore believes that dogs and hands 
and, for that matter, soap-bubbles are ipso facto (qua dogs, hands, 
soap-bubbles) mind-independent objects: “I think . . . that from any 
proposition of the form ‘There’s a soap-bubble!’ there does really fol­
low the proposition ‘There’s an external object!’ ‘There’s an object 
external to all our minds!”’ (Moore 1959: 145; emphasis original). 
Here Moore is asserting what Berkeley (and Husserl, and every rea­
sonable ontological idealist) firmly denies: that the proposition ‘X is 
a mind-independent object’ (or ‘X could exist without any realm of 
consciousness existing’) is a logical consequence of ‘X is a common­
sense object (a dog, hand, soap-bubble, etc.).’
Who is right in this controversy regarding a question of logic 
(broadly conceived)? Moore or Berkeley? To be precise, the question 
is whether Berkeley or Moore in 1939 is right. For, as a matter of fact, 
Moore can be said to have believed in 1928/1929 that Berkeley is 
right. See the last sentence of the above quotation from Moore’s 
1928/1929 lecture: “It may possibly be true, as B. would have said, 
that this desk is not independent of perception.”23 But in 1939, Moore 
had changed his mind. Did Moore in 1939 have a better grasp of the 
logical grammar of English than Berkeley had in the eighteenth cen­
tury? Or vice versa?—I rather doubt it. What we really have before us 
in this controversy is an utterly fundamental conceptual question 
that has no preformed answer whatsoever; it marks the great divide 
between two philosophical worlds.
NOTES
1. See Moore 1959: 145-46, and the appendix to this essay for a brief 
discussion of Moore’s argument, with Berkeley and Kant in the vicinity.
2. See Berkeley 1965: §22-§24, §34.
3. See, for example, Husserl 1950: §47, §48, §135.
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4. See the first and second of Descartes’s Meditations. The in-principle 
possibility of the world of consciousness existing all by itself can be used as 
a premise for establishing substance dualism; see my neo-Cartesian argu­
ment in Meixner 2004.
5. The attempt to do so leads to absurdity, because it seeks to obtain a 
perspective for the acquisition of knowledge that is not a perspective for a 
conscious subject: the view from nowhere, as Thomas Nagel was to call this 
impossible perspective.
6. The terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are used as synonyms in 
this essay. Aside from this special, stipulated usage, the first designation is 
accurate in describing the modern content of the doctrine (whereas the sec­
ond designation is not); the second designation is continuous with the long 
history of the doctrine (whereas the first designation is not).
7. In this essay, the words ‘entity,’ ‘exist(s),’ and ‘existent’ are taken to 
express, with different grammatical functions, the same content. Moreover, 
‘entity,’ ‘exist(s),’ and ‘existent’ are stipulated to be synonymous with ‘actual 
(or real) entity,’ ‘actually exist(s),' and ‘actually existent.’ (Note that ‘actu­
ally’ adds content here, and is not a mere device of emphasis.) “There exists 
a P,” “there is an existent P,” “some P exists,” “some entity is (a) P,” “some 
existent entity is (a) P”—all these sentences are taken to mean the same 
thing. But “something is (a) P” and “there is a P” do not necessarily prolong 
the list; to see this, replace “P” by the adjectival expression “merely possible” 
or by the corresponding substantive expression “mere possibile” (just as the 
grammar of the context of replacement requires).
8. The word ‘physical’—this ambiguous word—is in this essay taken 
to be synonymous with ‘mind-independently physical*’ (where ‘physical*’ 
expresses a neutral root-sense). Accordingly, something is nonphysical if, 
and only if, it is not mind-independently physical*. Only in the described 
sense of ‘physical’ and ‘nonphysical’ can the thesis that all concrete entities 
are nonphysical be regarded as an adequate formulation of ontological ideal­
ism (since an ontological idealist will not hesitate to assert that a chair is a 
‘physical object’—meaning by this: mind-dependently physical* object).
9. Dennett 1991 can certainly be read in this way.
10. I note in passing that Berkeley corresponded with a Samuel John­
son, but wot with the famous Doctor. See Berkeley 1965.
11. Not all physical* entities are physical* in the same neutral root­
sense. For example, an existent property which is physical* is not physical* 
in the same sense in which an existent physical* individual is physical*. The 
large stone against which Johnson strikes his foot is an existent individual, 
and it is shown to be physical* by the fact that Johnson strikes his foot 
against it. Being a large stone is an existent property, and it is, indeed, physi­
cal*; but this property is certainly not shown to be physical* by Johnson’s
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striking his foot against it (one cannot strike a property). Rather, that prop­
erty is existent and physical* (i.e., a physical* entity) because it is exempli­
fied by individuals which are physical*, and exemplified solely by such 
individuals. (Note that exemplification is taken to require that the exempli- 
fier is existent.)
12. Here the words ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ must of course be taken 
in their normal—mentalistic—sense. There are also specifically materialis­
tic ways of understanding the words ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness,’ which, 
however, are useless for formulating the materialistic doctrine in such a way 
that it stands in contrast to dualism. A materialist can understand ‘mind’ in 
such a way that she can agree to the assertion “Some concrete entities are 
not mind-independently physical*.” Why? “Because my current brain states, 
though physical* entities, do not exist in a way that is independent of every 
waking brain.” And she can understand ‘consciousness’ in such a way that 
she can agree to the assertion “Some concrete entities are not such that they 
are physical* and could exist even if no realm of consciousness existed.” 
Why? “Because my current brain states, though physical* entities, do not 
exist in such a way that they could exist even if no waking brain existed.”
13. The other manner of ontological independence of A  from C is this: 
with C existing, A  might still not exist.
14. Nor does it follow that A  cannot be a cause of B. But I will concen­
trate on the other alleged impossibility of causation, the already mentioned 
converse one.
15. For a closer scrutiny of principles of causal closure, see Meixner 
2008 and Meixner 2009.
16. Every object is per se an entity; the converse of this per-se inclu­
sion, however, I consider to be false. Just like the word ‘entity’ (cf. note 7), 
the word ‘object’ has existential import, as in fact follows (on the basis of 
note 7) from ‘entity’ being entailed by ‘object.’ Note that the word ‘object’ 
has a different, entirely relative sense in the expression ‘intentional object 
(of).’ Properties, for example, which are not objects, can yet be intentional 
objects, and so can nonentities.
17. This is rather evident in the following passage: “(TryJ whether 
you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to 
exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make 
you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction” (Berkeley 
1965: 69 r§22j).
18. See Husserl 1952: §§1-18; Husserl 1950: §135. Husserl never fell 
into the (just-mentioned) confusion that Berkeley—and so many other on­
tological idealists—did not manage to stay clear of.
19. Above (in the section “The Strength of Materialism"), materialism, 
dualism, and ontological idealism have been formulated in such a way that
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they form a complete disjunction. Hence, according to that way of formula­
tion, there is no place for a third monism, neutral monism, as it is usually 
called. Yet the end of the previous section suggests that there is a place for 
neutral monism in a manner o f speaking—not besides materialism, dualism, 
and ontological idealism, but underlying dualism.
20. See Meixner 2004, Meixner 2006, Meixner 2008.
21. Decision makers are distinguished from mere generators of (genu­
ine) chance events by their (at least rudimentary) rationality.
22. If the confluence of the right causes, under the right circumstances, 
came about by design, it is still correct to say that the appearance of the 
mind property is an outcome of natural evolution, that it is, in short, natural; 
for only its first, remote cause is supernatural; its second, nearer causes are 
natural.
23. The desk is a commonsense object. Therefore, according to Moore 
in 1939, it follows that the desk is a mind-independent object; in other 
words, according to Moore in 1939, relative to the desk being a common­
sense object, it is necessary that it be a mind-independent object. But accord­
ing to Moore in 1928/1929, relative to the desk being a commonsense 
object, it is possible that it be not a mind-independent object.
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